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Abstract 
 
Objective: Persons who claim memory loss for the crime of which they are suspected represent a problem for the 
legal system. When such claims emerge, the court often relies on expert testimonies. Mental health profession-
als who act as experts in these cases often assume that the memory loss is caused by a combination of strong 
emotions and abundant substance use (e.g., alcohol). It is also common to gather arguments for such an inter-
pretation by interviewing the offender or suspect. However, discriminating between different kinds of amnesia 
requires the use of sophisticated tests and tasks. Methods: By reviewing clinical, experimental, and psychomet-
ric literature, this article addresses several forms of crime-related amnesia and discusses the difficulties that 
arise when expert testimony about this phenomenon is given. It also emphasizes the importance of technical 
knowledge about diagnostic quality parameters. Results:  A review of the literature shows that dissociative 
amnesia is not the only or even the most prevalent form of offender amnesia. Experts should at least take the 
possibility of other forms of amnesia (i.e., organic amnesia; malingered amnesia) into account. Conclusion: 
Expert testimonies about crime-related amnesia should not rely exclusively on interviews or archival data. 
Rather such testimonies require tests and tasks combined with good diagnostic interviews (German J Psychia-
try 2002; 5: 24-34) 
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Introduction 
t is not uncommon that offenders claim memory loss 
(i.e., amnesia) for their crime. As a matter of fact, 25-
45% of criminals found guilty of homicide claim amne-
sia for the event (e.g., Kopelman, 1995). In cases where 
suspects claim crime-related amnesia, the court often asks 
for expert testimony. Triers of fact seem to assume that an 
expert is able to differentiate between various kinds of 
genuine amnesia, as well as between genuine amnesia and 
simulated amnesia. According to Schacter (1986), there are 
two obvious legal reasons as to why it is important to ex-
plore crime-related amnesia. To begin with, amnesia raises 
the issue of automatism, which refers to criminal behavior 
that is executed unconsciously and without intent. The 
issue of automatism is, of course, critical for legal responsi-
bility. We will return to the difference between “sane” and 
“insane” automatism later on. Secondly, amnesia raises the 
issue of competency to stand trial. An accused who has no 
memory of the crime event cannot plead in their own 
cause, simply because they are unable to inform their coun-
sel (Schacter, 1986). Thus, such a person might be incom-
petent to stand trial. 
In a study of Merckelbach, Cima, and Nijman (2002) popu-
lar beliefs about crime-related amnesia were investigated. 
I
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The authors describe a typical but real crime case in which 
an offender, after a night out with heavy use of alcohol and 
cocaine, stabbed someone to death. The offender claimed 
amnesia for the homicide. The court appointed a mental 
health professional in order to give an expert testimony 
about the amnesia of the offender. Based on two interviews, 
this expert concluded that the crime-related amnesia was a 
result of “the high level of alcohol and drug use”. This case 
was administered to 54 lay persons. They were asked 
whether they thought that genuine amnesia would be a 
plausible scenario in this type of crime. The majority of 
them (82%) indicated that it was a plausible scenario. A 
majority (76%) also felt that the court was very wise to ap-
point a forensic expert. As well, respondents had very 
strong opinions about the origin of the amnesia. A large 
majority of the respondents (70%) felt that alcohol, co-
caine, strong emotions or a combination of these are re-
sponsible for offenders’ amnesia. Apparently, offenders 
who claim crime-related amnesia do not need to worry that 
their claim meets widespread disbelief. Merckelbach and 
associates (2002) wondered whether this has to do with the 
way in which they presented this case. They construed a 
version of the case in which the offender claimed to re-
member “every second of the stabbing” extremely well. 
Having read this version, a new sample of respondents (N = 
54) were asked whether they could also imagine the oppo-
site, namely an offender developing amnesia for the stab-
bing incident. Again, the large majority (74%) thought that 
it is perfectly possible that an offender develops complete 
amnesia for his crime. The idea that strong emotions, alco-
hol and/or drugs may affect offenders in such way that they 
fully forget what they have done is apparently widespread. 
The ideas of lay people about crime-related amnesia would 
be of little or no concern to us, were it not that judges and 
lay judges are lay people who have to decide about the plau-
sibility of claims of crime-related amnesia. One would argue 
that these triers of fact rely on expert testimony precisely to 
overcome their lack of technical knowledge. On the other 
hand, in cases of claimed amnesia, mental health profes-
sionals who act as expert witnesses often rely on notions 
and assumptions that come dangerously close to those of 
lay people. In the sections that follow, we first discuss the 
prevalence rates and different manifestations of crime-
related amnesia. We then move on to the legal significance 
of amnesia claims. Next, we focus of on several crucial 
discriminations that experts have to make in cases where 
such claims emerge: Thus, the expert has to differentiate 
between dissociative amnesia, feigned (i.e., simulated amne-
sia), and organic amnesia. He/she also has to consider 
critically the precise role that alcohol plays in this category 
of cases. Following a detailed examination of these issues, 
we turn to diagnostic and psychometric topics. We will 
argue that powerful tools are available to discriminate be-
tween various forms of crime-related amnesia. We conclude 
with a consideration of the specialized knowledge that these 
seemingly simple tools require.  
Crime-related Amnesia 
Offenders who claim amnesia for their crime are by no 
means rare. In an older study of Leitch (1948), 51 murder-
ers were interviewed and 14 (27%) of them claimed amne-
sia for their crime. Taylor and Kopelman (1984) replicated 
this study by interviewing 34 murderers: 9 (26%) of them 
claimed amnesia. In a more recent study, Gudjonsson, 
Petursson, Skulason, and Sigurdardottir (1989) investigated 
64 convicted criminals. This time, 21 (32%) claimed amne-
sia for there crime. As a rule of thumb, 20 to 30% of of-
fenders of violent crimes claim amnesia for their crime. 
While these claims are often raised in the context of mur-
der or manslaughter cases, there are other crime categories 
in which claims of amnesia do occur. For example, claims 
of amnesia regularly occur in sexual crime cases (Bourget & 
Bradford, 1995), domestic violence cases (Swihart, Yuille & 
Porter, 1999), and fraud cases (Kopelman, Green, Guinan, 
Lewis & Stanhope, 1994).  
In the literature, all kinds of taxonomies have been pro-
posed to distinguish between different types of amnesia 
(e.g., Schacter, 1986; Loewenstein, 1991; Kopelman, 1995; 
Kihlstrom & Schacter, 1995). Most taxonomies agree that, 
at the very least, three amnesia types should be considered: 
dissociative amnesia (formerly termed psychogenic or func-
tional amnesia), organic amnesia, and feigned amnesia 
(“malingered amnesia”). Dissociative amnesia for criminal 
behavior is thought to originate from extreme emotions 
that accompany such behavior. Several authors have argued 
that dissociative amnesia is characteristic for crimes that are 
unplanned, involve a significant other, and are committed 
in a state of strong agitation (e.g., Loewenstein, 1991; Ko-
pelman, 1995). The idea behind this is that extreme levels 
of arousal during the crime may hamper memory retrieval 
at a later point in time. Thus, a failure in so-called retrieval 
processes would underlie dissociative amnesia such that the 
offender who subsequently has come to his senses, finds it 
impossible to access memories stored during a moment of 
turbulence. A term often used in the Anglo-Saxon literature 
to describe amnesia as a consequence of strong emotions 
(e.g., rage) is “red-out”. In the words of Swihart et al. 
(1999): “ Apparently, an individual can get so angry with 
his/her intimate partner that s/he can severely beat or kill 
that partner and then not remember doing so: that is, they 
can experience a red-out resulting in circumscribed amne-
sia” (p. 200). We will discuss the merits of this interpreta-
tion later on.  
Organic amnesia is always caused by a neurological defect. 
This defect may be structural (e.g., epilepsy, brain trauma), 
but it may also be momentary such as in the case of alcohol 
or drug intoxication. Kopelman (1995) assumes that mem-
ory loss in organic amnesia has to do with storage problems 
rather than retrieval problems: due to an epileptic seizure, 
brain damage or intoxication, offenders would not be able 
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to store their memories in the first place, which would 
eventually lead to a total “blackout” for their crime.  
A number of authors have emphasized that excessive alco-
hol use often contributes to dissociative amnesia for crime 
(Kopelman, 1995; Bourget & Bradford, 1995; Swihart et 
al., 1999). Bower’s (1981) “state-dependent memory theory” 
is often invoked to account for the combination of dissocia-
tive amnesia and alcohol (Swihart et al., 1999). In short, 
this theory states that when memories are stored in an 
exceptional context (strong emotion and/ or under the 
influence of alcohol), subsequent retrieval of these memo-
ries is facilitated when a similar context is reinstated. How-
ever, in a different context (e.g., when one is relaxed and 
sober), the pertinent memories would be inaccessible and 
so dissociative amnesia would occur. The case of Sirhan 
Sirhan, who was held responsible for the murder on Robert 
Kennedy, is often presented as an example of state depend-
ent memory. Sirhan claimed that he was unable to remem-
ber the murder. However, when he was hypnotized and 
brought into an agitated state, he suddenly said he remem-
bered the details of the murder. 
As for feigned amnesia, offenders may malinger amnesia for 
a crime in an attempt to obstruct police investigation 
and/or to avoid responsibility for their acts. In an older 
study, Hopwood and Snell (1933) found that 20% of the 
offenders who claimed amnesia were malingerers. However, 
there are good reasons to believe that the rate of malinger-
ing is actually much higher (see below). The literature pro-
vides strong examples of defendants who feigned amnesia 
in order to gain tactical advantage in legal procedures. Our 
favorite example is that of Rudolf Hess, who at the start of 
the “Nuremberg” trials, claimed to be amnestic for his 
Third Reich period. A group of prominent psychiatrists 
examined Hess and concluded that his amnesia was genu-
ine. When it became clear to Hess that the amnestic role 
confers a disadvantage in the sense that one cannot respond 
to allegations, he suddenly announced during one of the 
trial sessions that he had fooled the psychiatrists and 
feigned his amnesia (Gilbert, 1971; for a somewhat differ-
ent interpretation see Picknett, Prince & Prioir, 2001).  
The Legal Context 
Does it matter legally when defendants claim crime-related 
amnesia? For the Anglo-Saxon situation Parwatikar, Hol-
comb and Menninger (1985) noted that: “no court has 
found a defendant incompetent to stand trial solely because 
of amnesia” (p.202) (see also Hermann, 1986). And, in-
deed, in Anglo-Saxon countries amnesia does not figure in 
the listing of disorders that regularly lead to “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” trial outcomes. Typically, such outcomes 
involve schizophrenia and mood disorders, especially in 
combination with alcohol or drug use. 
Still, according to some leading Anglo-Saxon commenta-
tors, claims of amnesia may have far-reaching legal implica-
tions (e.g., Bradford & Smith, 1979). Meanwhile, it is not 
amnesia per se, but what amnesia reveals about the state of 
the defendant at the moment he committed his crime. 
More specifically, amnesia may indicate a state of “automa-
tism”, which refers to unconscious, non-intentional, and 
therefore uncontrollable behavior. In the literature, eccen-
tric examples of “automatic” crimes committed during 
sleepwalking, epileptic seizures, or hypoglycaemia states, 
abound.  
In countries like Canada and Australia, automatism has 
been divided into “sane” and “insane” automatism. For 
both types of automatism, it is assumed that the mens rea 
(i.e., “wicked mind”) aspect of the crime, is at stake 
(Hermann, 1986). “Sane” automatism refers to a crime 
committed by someone who is essentially healthy, but who 
is in a temporary state of madness due to some external 
agent (e.g., insulin). Such a scenario may lead to acquittal. 
“Insane” automatism refers to a crime originated from 
structural brain dysfunction. The prototypical example is 
the man who killed his neighbor during an epileptic seizure 
(Fenwick, 1993). Such a scenario can lead to a “not guilty 
by reason of insanity” verdict. Kopelman (1995) notes that 
“automatic” crimes always fall prey to amnesia. However, 
the opposite does not hold: when a defendant claims crime-
related amnesia, it does not necessarily imply that the crime 
came about automatically (Kalant, 1996). Curiously 
enough, this is nevertheless what the German Bundes-
gerichtshof seems to think, because it argued that “a veri-
fied amnesia for the criminal act - alone or in combination 
with other factors – is a sign of an emotionally based disor-
der of consciousness” (BGH 4 Str 207/87; see also Barbey, 
1990). 
Another point that is important to stress is that the distinc-
tion between controlled behavior, “sane” automatism, and 
“insane” automatism is more problematic than it at first 
glance may appear. Referring to several case examples, 
McSherry (1998) showed that this distinction is highly 
dependent on arbitrary judgments made by expert wit-
nesses: it just depends on what a forensic expert is willing to 
consider as a structural brain dysfunction. She described 
two similar cases of domestic murder. Due to expert witness 
testimonies, one case was classified as “sane” automatism 
leading to full acquittal, whereas the other case, was classi-
fied as an example of “insane” automatism, leading to a 
“not criminally responsible” verdict and admission to a 
psychiatric hospital.  
What science says 
Lay persons’ ideas about what is possible, do not by defini-
tion have to be wrong. However, for a trial judge who is 
confronted with a defendant claiming amnesia, the issue of 
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what is possible is less interesting. In as much as the judge 
appreciates expert witness testimonies, he will mostly bene-
fit from an expert who educates him about the type of am-
nesia that the defendant is suffering from and how this 
diagnostic judgment was reached. For the expert witness, it 
is very difficult to differentiate between dissociative, organic 
or feigned amnesia on the basis of interviews with the de-
fendant. This has to do with the fact that simulators can 
give a compelling imitation of someone with a dissociative 
or organic amnesia. It is only on the basis of psychological 
tests and tasks, that an expert will be able to identify simu-
lators. Nevertheless, our impression is that mental health 
professionals acting as experts in cases of amnesia often use 
interviews with the defendant as the sole source for making 
their diagnostic judgments. This state of affairs is hardly 
surprising: the average mental health professional is not a 
memory specialist and has no specialized knowledge about 
tests that might be helpful in discriminating between disso-
ciative, organic, and feigned amnesia. We will take a closer 
look at this distinction below.  
Dissociative versus feigned amnesia 
Dissociative amnesia is defined as “an inability to recall 
important personal information, usually of a traumatic or 
stressful nature, that is too extensive to be explained by 
ordinary forgetfulness” (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994: p. 477). A number of authors have argued that the 
term dissociative amnesia is quite confusing (Pope, Hud-
son, Bodkin & Oliva, 1998; Kopelman, 1995). It not only 
suggests that the cause of the memory loss is a dissociation 
between consciousness and memory, it also assumes that 
memory loss for emotional trauma does exist. Although lay 
people find it very plausible that an emotional provocative 
event, like murder, can lead to memory loss (cf. supra), 
specialists have not yet reached a consensus about this. For 
example, some authors (e.g., Kopelman,1995) opine that 
dissociative amnesia does exist and their most important 
argument is that defendants who claim amnesia often in-
form the police about the crime: “This makes an account of 
amnesia as simulation to avoid punishment less plausible” 
(p.435; for a similar reasoning, see Porter, Birt, Yuille & 
Herve, 2001). However, this argument is not very convinc-
ing. A defendant who knows that there is a vast amount of 
forensic evidence against him, may argue that he will make 
a more sympathetic impression on triers of fact if he simu-
lates amnesia than if he provides them with a lucid descrip-
tion of the crime details. Thus, Sadoff (1974) argues that 
most cases of dissociative amnesia are actually feigned. 
There are three good reasons to take his point seriously. 
The first is that there is quite some knowledge about the 
psychological characteristics of those who claim dissociative 
amnesia for a crime. Older studies reported that criminals 
who make such claims can be distinguished from other 
criminals by their relatively low intelligence and their hys-
terical traits (O’Connel, 1960; Parwatiker et al., 1985). In 
this context, hysterical traits refers to manipulative behav-
ior, including the tendency to feign symptoms (O’Connel, 
1960).  
While the concept of hysteria has largely disappeared from 
psychiatric vocabulary, the findings of more recent studies 
in this domain point in the same direction. For example, 
Lynch and Bradford (1980) reported that claims of amnesia 
are often raised by defendants with an antisocial personality 
disorder. A hallmark feature of this disorder is, of course, 
manipulative behavior (Porter et al., 2001). Similarly, Cima, 
Merckelbach, Hollnack, and Knauer (2002a) noted that 
criminals who claimed amnesia had low intelligence and 
displayed antisocial personality features. The picture emerg-
ing from these studies is that defendants who claim disso-
ciative amnesia often rely on a simple form of denial in an 
attempt to minimize their responsibility.  
A second reason to critically consider claims of dissociative 
amnesia is that the idea of amnesia for crime is based on 
the dubious assumption that “the majority of crimes which 
are followed by amnesia are those accompanied by strong 
emotional reactions” (Hopwood & Snell, 1933, p.32). Ac-
cording to this interpretation, strong emotions lead to 
repression or, to use a more recent notion, to dissociation 
and this would produce “retrieval” problems. If this line of 
reasoning were correct, one would expect that, for example, 
victims of concentration camps would also display amnesia 
for the horrifying events they have experienced. However, 
this is not the case (e.g., Kuch & Cox, 1992; Yehuda, Elkin, 
Binder-Brynes, Kahana, Southwick, Schmeidler & Giller, 
1996). On a related note, eyewitnesses of extreme violence 
seldom develop amnesia for the events they witnessed (Por-
ter et al., 2001). In short, the notion that people may de-
velop amnesia for events that are accompanied by strong 
emotions, is very controversial (Pope et al., 1998) and, 
therefore, it is wise to consider dissociative amnesia as a 
rare phenomenon. 
A third reason to be skeptical about claims of dissociative 
amnesia is that recent psychiatric literature shows that a not 
insignificant minority of people tend to feign a variety of 
symptoms and tend to confabulate stories if this serves their 
interests. For example, it is estimated that as many as 20% 
of closed head injury patients pursuing financial compensa-
tion exaggerate their symptoms (Binder & Rohling, 1996). 
Likewise, in the United States hundreds of Vietnam veter-
ans with Post Traumatic Stress complaints have never even 
served in Vietnam (Burkett & Whitley, 1998). When motor 
vehicle accident victims feign neurological complaints and 
when military personnel invent a complete autobiography 
to qualify for disability payments, why should the criminal 
who simulates amnesia be a rarity? Let’s put it in a different 
way: lay persons as well as many expert witnesses tend to 
view dissociative amnesia as the rule and feigned amnesia as 
the exception. Given the considerations discussed above, 
we think that it would be wise to reverse these probability 
estimates. This conclusion is further supported by studies in 
which normal subjects were instructed to play the role of a 
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murderer who during interrogation is confronted with 
abundant evidence. The most frequently chosen strategy of 
these subjects is to claim amnesia for the criminal act and 
to attribute it to an internal force that they cannot control 
(Spanos, Weekes & Bertrand, 1986; Merckelbach, Devilly 
& Rassin, 2001a).  
The role of alcohol 
As mentioned earlier, excessive alcohol or drug use is often 
said to precede criminal acts for which later dissociative 
amnesia is claimed. At least, that is what criminals who 
claim such memory loss tell researchers and expert wit-
nesses. The “state-dependent memory” hypothesis is often 
invoked to explain the apparent link between alcohol and 
amnesia (Swihart et al., 1999), but a close look at the litera-
ture shows that this hypothesis is not based on solid evi-
dence. For example, in a study of Wolf (1980), a substantial 
amount of alcohol was given to criminals who had commit-
ted murder under the influence of alcohol and who claim 
to be amnestic. The “state-dependent memory” hypothesis 
would lead one to predict that alcohol would produce 
complete disappearance of the amnesia, but this is not what 
happened. Subjects maintained that they could not re-
member the crime details.  
Admittedly, the phenomenon of “alcohol blackout” does 
exist. However, this phenomenon is best viewed as an or-
ganic form of amnesia resulting from an excessive amount 
of alcohol consumed within a very short time span (e.g., 5 
glasses of whisky or 20 glasses of beer within 4 hours; 
Goodwin, 1995). Even if subjects consume such a large 
dose, only some of them will develop an “alcohol blackout”. 
Furthermore, in most cases where dissociative amnesia is 
claimed, alcohol doses do not reach such an extreme level. 
This suggests that in these cases, defendants’ reference to 
alcohol or drug use may fulfil a different function, namely 
that of the “partial excuse for the essentially inexcusable” 
(Room, 2001: p. 194). That is, for those who have seriously 
violated the law, an appeal to alcohol or drug intoxication 
may give an explanation for the crime that has been com-
mitted as well as for the memory loss that is claimed. The 
example of the Canadian Supreme Court shows that courts 
are not insensitive to such “intoxication defense”. In the 
case of a rapist who claimed not to remember the crime 
because he was in a state of alcohol intoxication, this Court 
ruled that the crime had been committed in a state of 
“drunken automatism” (Kalant, 1996). Lay persons not 
only seem to have strong opinions about the plausibility of 
dissociative amnesia, they also have strong opinions about 
the behavioral and memory effects of alcohol or drugs. 
Again, these opinions are not always in line with what is 
actually known about these effects.  
The role of expectations 
Experiments show that the behavioral effects of alcohol are 
to a great extent guided by expectations that people have 
about these effects: “Things that are believed real are real in 
their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928: p. 572). A 
straightforward procedure to demonstrate this phenome-
non is the so-called “balanced placebo design”. The crux of 
this design is that some subjects are given a non-alcoholic 
drink that they believe to contain alcohol, whereas other 
persons consume an alcoholic drink that they believe is a 
non-alcoholic refreshment. Under these circumstances, 
extravert behavior, tension reduction, and other positive as 
well as negative effects that people associate with alcohol do 
not depend on actual alcohol intake, but on the belief that 
one has consumed alcohol (Critchlow, 1986). This finding 
underlines the fact that people have strong ideas about the 
effects of alcohol which in turn may affect their behavior.  
Is it possible that a similar expectancy effect occurs in cases 
of dissociative amnesia? In other words, is it possible that 
some defendants claim amnesia for their crime because they 
assume that this is a probable outcome, given the traumatic 
character of the event and the use of alcohol? The case of 
Gudjonsson, Kopelman, and MacKeith (1999) demon-
strates that such an imaginary amnesia does exist. In this 
case, a defendant was convicted for the murder of a little 
girl. During the police interrogations, he could not remem-
ber anything of the crime. Experts interpreted this as a 
manifestation of dissociative amnesia, a scenario in which 
the defendant himself started to believe, subsequently, it 
became clear that he was innocent.  
Germane to the issue of expectations is also an experiment 
of Christianson and Bylin (1999). These authors gave their 
subjects a case vignette of a murder and subjects were in-
structed to identify themselves with the offender. Next, one 
group of subjects was told to play the role of an amnestic 
offender during a task that consisted of a series of questions 
about the case. The control group was encouraged to per-
form this task as best they could. After a week, subjects 
returned to the lab and, again, answered questions about 
the case. This time, all subjects were instructed to perform 
as best they could. During the first testing session, subjects 
who played an amnestic role gave fewer correct answers 
than the control group. This is not remarkable: it only 
shows that the “amnestic” subjects took their role seriously. 
However, during the one-week follow-up test session ex-
simulators were still performing under the level of control 
subjects. This is remarkable: apparently, “playing” amnesia 
has memory-undermining effects. It is not too far-fetched to 
assume that expectations are the driving force behind this 
effect. That is, people who initially play the role of an am-
nestic person may have a strong expectation that they will 
perform poorly on subsequent memory tasks. This, in turn, 
may give rise to a “self-fulfilling prophecy” when the person 
is given such a memory task. This phenomenon is also 
known from studies on placebos. Subjects who receive a 
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placebo in combination with the story that it is a memory-
undermining substance later perform less well on memory 
tasks than do control subjects (Kvavilashvili & Ellis, 1999). 
To sum up, then, a defendant who claims memory loss is 
often classified by experts as someone with dissociative 
amnesia, but there are at least two alternative interpreta-
tions that should be considered: malingered amnesia and 
imaginary amnesia.  
Organic versus feigned amnesia 
Unlike dissociative amnesia, organic amnesia is a relatively 
unproblematic phenomenon. In many cases, organic amne-
sia will be a persistent symptom of traumatic brain injury, 
or closed head injury. Note that in this context the word 
trauma has a completely different meaning. In the psychiat-
ric literature, it refers to a major emotional event (e.g., a 
crime), whereas in the neurological context it refers to the 
external causes (accidents, drugs, fights) of acute brain 
damage (Hacking, 1996). Even in cases of mild traumatic 
brain injury, acute loss of consciousness and subsequent 
Post Traumatic Amnesia (PTA) may occur. PTA refers to 
disoriented behavior and serious memory problems imme-
diately after the incident that caused the brain injury. 
When loss of consciousness exceeds 30 minutes and PTA 
duration is longer than 24 hours, the traumatic brain injury 
is said to be severe (Faust, 1996). 
Regardless of whether the brain injury is mild or severe, in 
the period after the PTA, the patient usually reports all 
kinds of complaints that vary from concentration difficul-
ties to depressive feelings. These complaints are sometimes 
referred to as the “post-concussion” syndrome, but this 
impressive term suggests more clarity than the neurological 
literature really offers. For example, Lees-Haley, Fox, and 
Courtney (2001) noted that most symptoms associated with 
this syndrome are surprisingly aspecific and are also highly 
prevalent among people who never sustained a brain injury. 
However, an inability to recall important details of the 
events surrounding the trauma (the incident, the fight) – 
organic amnesia – is a rather specific symptom of post-
concussion syndrome. According to the 19th century French 
memory psychologist Theodule Ribot (Haber & Haber, 
1998), organic amnesia follows a course that is now known 
as Ribot’s law. More specifically, this law refers to the phe-
nomenon that organic amnesia pertains to the traumatic 
incident itself and events that immediately preceded and/or 
followed it, rather than events that took place long before 
the trauma. If such older memories have nevertheless be-
come inaccessible, they will return sooner in the weeks 
following the trauma than more recent memories that have 
become inaccessible. Eventually, the amnesia will largely 
disappear, and will be limited to the traumatic event itself 
and the few seconds that preceded it.  
There are reasons to believe that the vague aspecific symp-
toms of post-concussion syndrome are sensitive to simula-
tion. This is mostly the case in civil law suits, in which, for 
example, vehicle accident victims require financial compen-
sation. In such cases, it is relatively easy to feign aspecific 
symptoms (Youngjohn, Burrows & Erdal, 1995). Mean-
while, organic amnesia is considerably more difficult to 
simulate, at least for lay persons, precisely because it has 
such a typical course. In other words, organic amnesia re-
quires the specific sequence of trauma, loss of conscious-
ness, PTA, memory loss relating to recent rather than old 
memories, and memory recovery in such a way that older 
memories come back more readily than more recent ones. 
If a person claims organic amnesia for a traumatic event 
(e.g., accident) that does not fit this sequence, there is every 
reason to be skeptical and to consider the possibility of 
feigned amnesia.  
Tests 
If a defendant claims crime-related amnesia, how should an 
expert witness determine what type of amnesia the defen-
dant is suffering from? One possibility is that the defendant 
has sustained brain injury and consequently developed 
organic amnesia. The expert may explore this possibility by 
examining whether and how the defendant’s amnesia dis-
appears over time. If the defendant’s amnesia follows Ri-
bot’s law, that information might be crucial for the defen-
dant’s counsel. Consider the example of the defendant 
charged with murder. If the defendant has organic amnesia 
and it can be shown that this amnesia originates from the 
victim hitting the defendant on his head before he was 
murdered, then a self-defense interpretation of the murder 
case might be considered.  
Another possibility is that a defendant believes that he is 
suffering from amnesia. As far as we know, there is no valid 
test to explore this possibility. However, with the findings 
of Kvavilashvili and Ellis (1999) in mind, the expert might 
consider giving the defendant a placebo along with the 
instruction that it is a memory-enhancing drug. In a way, 
such a manipulation is deceptive, but on the other hand, is 
highly similar to forensic hypnosis, because in hypnosis 
expectations also play a key role.  
A third possibility is that a defendant feigns his amnesia. 
Again, this possibility needs to be scrutinized and this can 
be done in either of two ways.  
Symptom Validity Testing 
The first way is to subject the defendant to a so-called 
Symptom Validity Test (SVT). With this method, it is pos-
sible to identify defendants who simulate amnesia (Freder-
ick, Carter & Powel, 1995; Denney, 1996). Basically, SVT 
procedures consist of a forced-choice recognition test. Dur-
ing SVT, the defendant is asked a series of dichotomous 
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(true-false) questions about the crime and the circumstances 
under which it took place. The defendant is instructed to 
guess in case he does not know the right answers because of 
his amnesia. Typically, 15 to 100 items are presented, each 
followed by a two-alternative forced-choice recognition. 
Typical questions asked in the SVT are for example “Did 
the offender use a pistol or a knife?”; “Was the person 
known to sell ecstasy or crack?”; “Was the victim black or 
white?”; and “Was the street made of cobblestones or as-
phalt?”. With any number of items, chance performance 
(guessing) can be determined fairly precisely. This has to do 
with the fact that purely random responding will result in 
about 50% of the answers being correctly answered. Indi-
viduals who perform significantly below chance avoid cor-
rect alternatives, which means that they have knowledge 
about the correct answers, and this implies that they are 
feigning memory impairment. SVT is based on binomial 
statistics and this has the clear advantage that one can 
quantify memory performance.1 Thus, one can determine 
the exact chance that someone with genuine memory loss 
will give only 3 right answers to 15 true-false questions. On 
the basis of chance such a person should have 6, 7 or 8 
correct answers. The chance that someone with memory 
loss will produce only 3 correct answers is smaller than 5% 
(see footnote 1; the exact chance can be calculated as fol-
lows: z = (3 + .5 – (15 x .5)/ √(15 x .5 x .5) = 2.1, which 
corresponds to a p-value of ≤ 0.02).  
Several case studies have been reported in which suspected 
(Frederick & Carter, 1993; Frederick, Carter & Powel, 
1995) or confirmed (Denney & Wynkoop, 1995) malinger-
ers showed a response pattern in which their performance 
fell below chance. One study (Denney, 1996) presents three 
cases within the criminal forensic setting. To evaluate the 
assumption that the procedure actually conforms to prob-
ability standards of the binomial theorem, this author used 
a normative sample of 60 adults who had no prior knowl-
edge of the events in question. Results of this study showed 
that this test procedure is rather robust and can handle 
variability in the probability of several items. Although the 
more questions created the more reliable the test and the 
more test variance it will contain (Crocker & Algina, 1986), 
the results of Denney (1996) suggests that even with a test 
of only 10 items, the varied item probability had little prac-
tical effect on the test. The sample (N = 60) means for each 
case were shown to be either the same as the hypothesized 
mean or were in the positive direction. For example, in one 
of the cases described, the defendant answered only 7 of 29 
questions correctly (z = -2.6, p< 0.005) which suggests that 
such a performance would only occur less than 5 times out 
of 1000 by chance alone. The sample results of this case 
showed a mean of 15.83 (SD = 2.77) and a range from 8 to 
23. Moreover, the distribution of item probabilities ap-
                                                 
1 The Binominal formula is as follows: z = [(x ± .5) – Np)] / √Npq, 
in which z is the test statistic (value and corresponding p can be 
looked up in a table), N is the number of items, x the number of 
correctly answered items, p the chance for a correct answer when 
one has to guess (idealy .5) and q is 1-p. 
peared quite symmetrical, suggesting that much of the vari-
ability is due to random chance.  
Some researchers have argued that a clever defendant who 
attempts to simulate amnesia will readily recognize the 
rationale behind SVT. By this view, defendants would 
quickly realize that they have to perform at chance level 
(half of the answers correct and the other half incorrect). A 
recent study by Merckelbach, Hauer, and Rassin (2001b) 
tested this idea. In this study, 20 students were instructed to 
steal an envelope with some money. Next, students were 
told to simulate amnesia in a way that would convince 
experts. To explore how well the SVT could identify this 
feigned amnesia, students took 15 true-false item SVT. 
More than half (53%) of the student sample had less than 4 
correct answers and, thus, they were identified as malinger-
ers. The other students succeeded in performing at chance 
level and thus, seemed to be able to simulate in a convinc-
ing way. However, post-experiment interviews with the 
subjects made it clear that only a minority of them were 
able to verbalize the rationale behind SVT.  
Given the fact that a majority of students cannot beat the 
SVT, the efficacy of the SVT in identifying malingering 
should be considerably better with less educated defendants 
who simulate amnesia. This is especially true if the number 
of SVT questions is increased. The Merckelbach et al. 
(2001b) experiment relied on a relatively small number of 
test items (i.e., 15). However, with more SVT items, say 30, 
it becomes more and more difficult for defendants to moni-
tor whether one is still performing at chance level. And 
even when defendants perform at chance level, there is an 
appropriate test to examine whether the pattern of correct 
and incorrect answers is random (as it should be in the case 
of genuine amnesia) or structured (as is the case in a strate-
gic attempt to perform at chance level) (Cliffe, 1992). A 
discussion of this “runs” test, falls beyond the scope of this 
article, but the principle behind it can be summarized as 
follows. Suppose you have a coin and on 15 consecutive 
trials you throw heads, while on the next 15 consecutive 
trials you throw tails. That would be nicely at chance level. 
However, there must be something wrong with the coin, 
because too few so-called “runs” have been made (namely 2) 
to assume that the pattern of heads and tails is random. 
The same is true for some forms of SVT performance at 
chance level. Those who during a SVT of 30 true-false items 
answer the first 15 items correctly and the last 15 items 
incorrectly, perform nicely at chance level, but are identi-
fied as malingerers by the “runs” test. So, even if the results 
fall within the predictably random range and distribution, 
but the response pattern shows that the first half of the test 
is answered correctly and the second half is not, it indicates 
a structured response pattern. To reveal malingerers one 
should not calculate the approximately equal numbers of 
true and false answers only, but should also consider 
whether the sequence of the true and false answers is at 
random.  
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SVT does not require much technical equipment. All one 
needs is a pencil, paper, and a basic knowledge of statistics. 
It is essential, though, that the correct and incorrect alter-
natives are first evaluated by a panel of inexperienced sub-
jects. If this panel judges the incorrect alternatives as more 
plausible than the correct alternatives, it is possible that 
someone with genuine amnesia will perform below chance 
level. In the clinical or forensic setting, this method of 
control might prove unwieldy and extremely time consum-
ing. Nevertheless, with this restriction in mind, we would 
like to recommend the SVT to experts who have to examine 
cases in which defendants claim amnesia.  
Self-reports 
A second way of examining claims of amnesia, is provided 
by self-report questionnaires that capitalize on the tendency 
of malingerers to exaggerate their memory complaints 
(Smith, 1997). In this context, a promising questionnaire is 
the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology 
(SIMS; Smith & Burger, 1997; for a German translation 
see: Cima, Hollnack, Kremer, Knauer, Schellbach-Matties, 
Klein & Merckelbach, 2002b). The SIMS consists of 75 
dichotomous (i.e., true-false) items that can be grouped into 
5 subscales, each subscale containing 15 items. Subscales 
correspond to symptoms domains that are sensitive to ma-
lingering and include low intelligence (LI), affective disor-
der (AF), neurological impairment (N), psychosis (P), and 
amnestic disorder (AM). Items of the subscales refer to 
bizarre experiences (e.g., “At times I’ve been unable to re-
member the names or faces of close relatives so that they 
seem like complete strangers”) or to unrealistic symptoms 
(e.g.,”When I can’t remember something, hints do not 
help”). Other items explicitly allude to a certain syndrome 
(e.g., amnesia) in such a way that specialists recognize that 
highly atypical symptoms are listed (e.g., “My past and im-
portant events became a blur to me almost overnight”). The 
idea is that malingerers will exaggerate and so will endorse 
bizarre, unrealistic, and atypical symptoms. Answers indicat-
ing malingering are summed to obtain a Total SIMS score.  
So far, a number of analog studies have looked at the accu-
racy with which the SIMS detects malingered symptomatol-
ogy (Rogers, Hinds & Sewell, 1996; Smith & Burger, 1997; 
Edens, Otto & Dwyer, 1999). Although these studies came 
up with promising results, one should note that with the 
exception of the study by Cima and colleagues (2002b), all 
studies relied on laboratory set-ups. In this type of study, 
undergraduate students are instructed to feign certain psy-
chiatric symptoms (e.g., amnesia) in a convincing way. Per-
formance of these instructed malingering groups on the 
SIMS is then compared to the SIMS scores of control (i.e., 
uninstructed) groups responding honestly. It is evident that 
this approach is subject to a number of limitations, not 
least of which is that for undergraduates instructed to ma-
linger symptoms there are hardly any risks or incentives. 
Nevertheless, so far the results with the SIMS are encourag-
ing in that subjects instructed to feign, say, amnesia can be 
identified with a high degree of precision. For example, 
Merckelbach and Smith (2001c) reported that more than 
90% of the subjects instructed to malinger amnesia are 
identified by the SIMS (sensitivity) and more than 90% of 
the control subjects are classified by the SIMS as honest 
respondents (specificity).  
In the one study that systematically looked at SIMS per-
formance of forensic patients (Cima et al., 2002b) a Ger-
man translation of the SIMS was administered to a sample 
consisting of 266 participants of whom 204 were under-
graduate students (98 men) and 62 were forensic inpatients 
(all men). The German SIMS showed excellent stability 
(0.97) as well as an acceptable consistency (Cronbach alpha 
coefficient = 0.80). None of the participants in the control 
sample (69 honestly responding healthy subjects) had a total 
score exceeding the cutoff point of 16 recommended by 
Rogers et al. (1996), while 86% of the instructed malinger-
ers (n = 135) and 27% of the forensic patients scored in this 
range.  
Data of honestly responding controls, instructed malingers 
and patients were pooled in order to calculate sensitivity, 
specificity, positive and negative predictive power (PPP and 
NPP). Using the cutoff score of 16, 87% of the malingerers 
were identified correctly (sensitivity), while 86.7% of the 
non-malingerers were classified correctly (specificity). The 
Positive Predictive Power (PPP), which is explained in the 
next section, was 0.87. In other words, the probability that 
someone with a Total SIMS score of 17 or higher was an 
instructed malingerer was 87%. The specificity of 86.7% 
implies a false alarm rate of 13.3%. In other words, 13.3% 
of the participants who did not receive an instruction to 
malinger nevertheless had Total SIMS scores exceeding the 
cutoff point. A closer look at these participants revealed 
that all of them were forensic psychiatric inpatients.  
Diagnostic accuracy 
Our discussion so far makes plain that experts who at the 
request of the court have to evaluate a case in which crime-
related amnesia is claimed can and should do more than 
just interview the defendant. The SVT as well as the SIMS 
are examples of tests that can be applied in this type of case. 
Other tests and tasks that can be of help are extensively 
discussed in Rogers (1997) and Hall and Poirier (2000).  
Selection and actual use of tests in amnesia cases should be 
guided by scientific literature and, more specifically, by 
what this literature tells the experts about diagnostic accu-
racy. Experts usually focus on sensitivity and specificity of 
diagnostic measurements. Sensitivity refers to the percent-
age of malingerers who are correctly classified by the test, 
while specificity refers to the percentage of honestly re-
sponding controls who are correctly identified. The idea 
that a diagnostic instrument is valid if research shows that 
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its sensitivity and specificity circle around 90% seems 
widely accepted by experts, but is misleading. An example 
taken from Rosenfeld, Sands and van Gorp (2000) may 
illustrate this point. Suppose that there is a questionnaire 
that intends to detect simulated amnesia and suppose that 
this instrument has been tested in a laboratory study that 
involved 50 subjects simulating amnesia and 50 honestly 
responding subjects (control group). Let us further assume 
that the results of this study showed that 45 of the 50 simu-
lators were identified by this questionnaire (sensitivity = 
90%), while 48 of the 50 control subjects were classified 
correctly (specificity = 96%). So, sensitivity and specificity 
rates are excellent, but this does not mean that the test is 
valid. The point is that these rates were obtained with a 
particular base-rate of malingering, namely 50% (50% of 
the subjects were simulating amnesia). If one lowers this 
base rate to, say, 10% (10 subjects simulate versus 90 sub-
jects respond honestly), diagnostic accuracy of the test will 
drop dramatically, although its sensitivity and specificity 
remain the same. Table 1 shows this effect. With a base rate 
of 50%, 45 of the malingerers are correctly identified and 2 
honestly responding subjects are misclassified as malinger-
ers. However, with a base rate of 10%, there are 9 correctly 
classified malingerers and 4 honest subjects who are mis-
classified. A good measure to capture these proportions is 
the Positive Predictive Power (PPP). PPP is concerned with 
the classification of the individual and this is what matters 
in a legal context. PPP pertains to the probability that an 
individual with a score that exceeds the cutoff does have the 
diagnosis (in this case, feigned amnesia). With a base rate of 
50%, the PPP of our fictitious instrument was 45/45 + 2 = 
96%. However, with a base rate of 10%, the PPP of this 
instrument drops to 9/9+4 = 69%. In other words, with 
such a base rate, the probability is 2 out of 3 that someone 
who has an above-cutoff score does indeed simulate amne-
sia. The take-home message of this example is that applying 
tests in order to identify simulated amnesia requires techni-
cal knowledge about diagnostic quality parameters (sensitiv-
ity, specificity and PPP) of these tests. This is essential, 
because it is only when the expert possesses such technical 
knowledge and communicates it to the court that trial 
judges become aware of strengths and limitations of diag-
nostic evaluations in amnesia cases. 
Conclusion 
It is not uncommon for defendants to claim amnesia for 
a crime of which they are accused. Mental health profes-
sionals who appear as expert witnesses in such cases often 
assume that this type of memory loss is the joint effect of 
strong emotions (i.e., dissociative amnesia) and excessive 
drug or alcohol use. It is also common to seek arguments 
for this interpretation by interviewing the defendant. In 
this article, we explained why this approach is dubious. 
Dissociative amnesia is not the only or even the most preva-
lent form of crime-related amnesia. Experts should at least 
take the possibility of other forms of amnesia into account. 
These other types involve simulated, imagined or organic 
amnesia. The diagnostic differentiation between these types 
of amnesia cannot take place solely on the basis of inter-
views. Professionals should use objective measures as op-
posed to relying on clinical judgement alone. Tests (e.g., the 
SIMS) and tasks (e.g., the SVT) are required to make this 
differentiation. As with interviews, the use of only one test 
is not sufficient in determining between the different types 
of amnesia. No one should be diagnosed as malingering 
simply from one test. Instead, proper diagnosis entails the 
appropriate synthesis of information from multiple data 
sources (structural interviews, observation, other test re-
sults), especially in the forensic setting. Statistically based 
procedures, when used judiciously and in conjunction with 
multiple data sources, should offset the inherent weak-
nesses of clinical judgement alone. Although these tests and 
tasks may seem simple, their use requires sophisticated 
knowledge about diagnostic quality parameters. Many psy-
chologists and psychiatrists will not possess this knowledge 
and therefore their competence to act as expert witnesses in 
cases in which claims of crime-related amnesia are raised is 
doubtful. 
Table 1: Sensitivity and specificity of a diagnostic in-
strument and how they relate to base rate. Values in 
parentheses show what happens when the base rate of 
malingering drops to 10%: 10 subjects malinger and 90 
perform honestly. TP = true positive, FP = false posi-
tive, FN = false negative and TN = true negative. Sensi-
tivity = TP/(TP+FN); specificity = TN/(FP+TN); PPP 
(Positive Predictive Power) = TP/(TP+FP) 
 Reality  
 Simulation Honest 
Test: 
Simulation 
 
Honest 
 
45 (TP) 
(9) 
5 (FN) 
(1) 
 
2 (FP) 
(4) 
48 (TN) 
(86) 
Sensitivity 
Specificity 
PPP 
 
0.90 
0.96 
0.90 
(0.69) 
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